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The Right to Counsel in Pretrial Investigation — Inmates Held in Administrative
Detention Pending Criminal Investigation: United States v. Gouveia' The sixth amend-
ment provides numerous rights to an individual accused in a criminal prosecution,
including "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 2 Commencing in 1932, the Supreme Court
began to construe the parameters of this constitutional guarantee and to formulate
guidelines for determining the point during a criminal prosecution when the Constitu-
tion mandates that the state provide counsel to the accused. 8 The vital role which the
right to counsel assumes in the American criminal justice system' is evidenced by the
Court's early recognition that the counsel guarantee is one of the "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." 5
Broadly stated, the primary purpose of the sixth amendment right to counsel is to
ensure fairness in the adversary criminal process. 6 The counsel guarantee ensures a fair
trial by providing an accused with a legal representative, who aids in the preparation of
a defense, to enable an accused to meet his adversary, the state.' Moreover, the counsel
guarantee helps to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system resulting from the
broad investigatory powers and almost unlimited resources possessed by public prose-
cutors.8 Thus, the sixth amendment guarantee is called a "trial right" because counsel's
assistance is required at any trial type confrontation between the accused and the state. 9
1 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984).
U.S. Cons'''. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to
- have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
3 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Prior to Powell, the right to counsel clause of the sixth
amendment had not been considered by the Supreme Court. Powell began an era of expansion and
explanation of the protections provided to an accused by the sixth amendment. Note, The Right to
Counsel: Attachment Before Criminal Judicial Proceedings?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 810, 810 n.2 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Right to Counsel].
Sixth amendment right to counsel jurisprudence has developed separately from the fifth
amendment counsel guarantee to protect an individual's privilege against self-incrimination. The
fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part that, "[n]o person ....shalt be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the most part, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is beyond the scope of this article.
4 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932). See infra notes 6t-70 and accompanying
text.
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926)).
6 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
7 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (an additional motivation for the American
right to counsel guarantee was a desire to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system that
would have resulted with the creation of a professional prosecutor). See also Note, An Historical
Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1034 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Counsel During Interrogation] ("Counsel, then, has been more than technical
aid, he has served to overcome the original unfairness of the balance of the state against individual.").
9 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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Recognizing that certain pretrial events could potentially decide an accused's fate,
courts have extended the right to counsel to certain events that occur prior to trial.'" In
these pretrial situations, the Court has stated that an accused individual is entitled to the
assistance of counsel during all "critical stages" of the proceedings against him." This
"critical stage" standard has been defined as any point in the pretrial confrontations of
the accused where "potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres."' 2
Recently, this broad and flexible standard allowing pretrial attachment of the right
to counsel has been restricted by the Supreme Court. 15
 Although the right to counsel
still attaches in certain pretrial situations, the Court has enunciated a rule that has
retreated from the "critical stage" standard. The attachment of the right to counsel is
now usually required only at the initiation of formal proceedings, either by way of
indictment, preliminary hearing, or arraignment,H in effect excluding counsel from
some "critical stages" of the proceedings against an accused. This restriction of the
counsel guarantee appears to have occurred because of the Court's concern with certain
practical problems associated with ensuring pretrial attachment of the guarantee.' 5
The most recent case interpreting the sixth amendment right to counsel protection,
United Slates v. Gouveia,' 6
 involved an evaluation of the counsel guarantee in the context
of a prolonged preindictment segregation of prison inmates in administrative deten-
tion. 17 In Gouveia, the Court stated that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings."' Thus, despite the prolonged segregation
'I' See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973) (although the Court did not extend the
right to counsel to the photographic identification at issue in Ash, the Court recognized that certain
pretrial events are, in reality, a portion of the trial itself). See also Coleman v, Alabama, 399 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1970) (the right to counsel attached at a preliminary hearing, regardless of its being a pretrial
event); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (the counsel guarantee attaches w the
preindictment custodial interrogation); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (193'2) (counsel's assis-
tance was required at the critical pretrial events, at least from arraignment to the trial itself).
" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
12
 United States v, Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
13 See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977) (Court applied mechanical standard in
holding that the right to counsel attaches at preliminary hearing); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 321 (1973) (right to counsel does not attach at postindictrnent photographic identification);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S, 682, 689 (1971) (plurality opinion) (right to counsel attaches only at the
initiation of formal criminal proceedings).
14
 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1971).
15
 There appear to be two major reasons underlying the replacement of the critical stage
standard with the bright-line test. First, in retreating to the bright-line test, the Court appeared to
be concerned with the practical implementation of a flexible test which permitted attachment of
the right to counsel at various stages of the prosecution depending upon the circumstances pre-
sented in each case. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1963) (White, J., dissenting) (the
Flexible test enunciated by the Escobedo Court is totally unworkable). Second and more critically, the
Court appeared to be very concerned with the exclusion of evidence which can result from violations
of various fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 441
(1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (due to the operation of the exclusionary rule, vital evidence will
not be admissible and the guilty party will go free). Recently, the Court has sought to limit the
operation of exclusionary rules, permitting the use of evidence which would otherwise have been
inadmissible. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (the Court approved the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule). For a further discussion of these practical problems, see infra
notes 219-236 and 302-310 and accompanying text.
16
 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984),
' 7 Id. at 2294-96.
'" Id. at 2297.
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of the suspected inmates in administrative detention pending the government's investi-
gation of the crime, the Court in Gouveia held that the right to counsel had not attached
because adversary proceedings had not been commenced by the state. 19
The litigation in Gouveia involved two groups of inmates who were treated in a
similar fashion by prison officials at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc,
California." Both groups were detained in administrative detention for prolonged pe-
riods of time pending criminal investigation by prison and government officials. 21 The
first group ("Gouveia group") was composed of four individuals: Gouveia, Ramirez,
Reynoso, and Segura, who were suspected of murdering a fellow inmate on November
11, 1978. 22 As soon as prison officials suspected these inmates, they were segregated
from the general prison population and placed in an administrative detention unit
("ADU" ). 25 From the outset of their segregation, the inmates repeatedly requested the
assistance of counse1.24 These requests were denied by prison authorities. 25 Pursuant to
prison regulations, 26 disciplinary hearings were held by prison officials in December of
1978. 27 Because the officials determined that all four of the inmates had participated in
the murder, their continued confinement in ADU was ordered. 28
In ADU, the inmates were separated from the general prison population. 29 Prison
officials and FBI investigators were the only contacts which the inmates had with the
outside world." They were confined to individual cells and their participation in prison
programs was curtailed. 3 ' All opportunities for education, recreation, and employment
were eliminated. 32 Thus, ADU confinement resulted in a substantial deprivation of the
19 Id. at 2300.
2" Id. at 2294-96.
21 Id. at 2294-95.
22 Id. at 2295.
22 Id.
24 Brief of Respondents Mills and Pierce in Opposition to the Petition at 2, U.S. v. Gouveia,
104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). See also United States v. Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1983).
22 United States v. Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1983).
2" See Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.10-.49 (1984). §§ 541.15-
.19 detail the procedures which prison officials are to follow in conducting hearings of the Insti-
tutional Disciplinary Commission. The full array of constitutional rights protecting a non-inmate
accused of a crime are not available to inmates in the disciplinary hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
27 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
2"Id.
29 Id. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.20(c)-(d), 541.22 (1984). These sections outline the restrictions which
administrative detention imposes.
3"Brief of Respondents Mills and Pierce in Opposition to the Petition at 2-4, United States v.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). The American Correctional Association defines administrative
segregation as a
level of custody into which an inmate may be classified as a result of a determination
that he presents a substantial risk to the security or order of the institution, the safety
of that inmate or others, and, therefore, requires separation from the general insti-
tution population and strict supervision in a highly structured, controlled setting.
Robinson, The Constitutional Rights of an Inmate at an Administrative Segregation Proceeding: Hewitt v.
Helms and the Withdrawal of Prisoners' Rights, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 57, 58 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Robinson] (quoting CORRECTIONAL LAW PROJECT, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL
RULES AND REGULATIONS (1979)).
31 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
22 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1118.
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freedoms which unconfined inmates retained, and eliminated all access to the general
prison population."
In March of 1979, a federal grand jury investigation into this murder began."
Sixteen months later, on July 17, 1980, the grand jury investigation culminated with the
return of an indictment against the Gouveia group charging them with first degree
murder." On July 14, 1980, after nearly nineteen months in ADU without the assistance
of counsel, the inmates were arraigned and counsel was appointed."
The second group of inmates in Gouveia ("Mills group"), composed of Mills and
Pierce, received similar treatment by prison authorities." On August 22, 1979, they were
accused of murdering a fellow inmate at Lompoc." Immediately following the murder,
Mills and Pierce were examined by a doctor and questioned by the FBI." Because their
involvement in the murder was suspected, the Mills group was placed in ADU following
this questioning.''' A disciplinary hearing was held on September 13, 1979. 41
 Prison
officials concluded that these inmates had committed the murder and ordered their
continued confinement in ADU. 42
 On March 27, 1980, a federal grand jury indicted
Mills and Pierce on charges of first degree murder.'" After eight months in ADU
confinement, they were arraigned on April 21, 1980 and counsel was appointed at that
time."
Prior to trial, both the Gouveia group and the Mills group filed motions to dismiss
their indictments arguing that the prolonged preindictment delay had violated either
their fifth amendment due process rights, 45 or, in the alternative, their sixth amendment
" See id. Inmates who are not confined in administrative detention enjoy freedoms such as
participation in educational, vocational training and employment programs. See aLso 28 C.F.R.
§ 541,12 (1984).
Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1118.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. The Gouveia inmates were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C,
§ 1111 and § 1117, murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
36 Id.
37 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
lo Id.
41 Id.
42 Id
411
 Id. at 2295-96. The Mills inmates were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, murder,
and 18 U.S.C. § 1792. conveyance of a weapon in prison. Pierce was also charged with assault in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(c). Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295-96.
41 Id.
"Id. at 2295. The due process clause appears in the Constitution in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. The Constitution provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . „ ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment applies
only to actions of the federal government, whereas the fourteenth amendment applies to actions
of the states. U.S. CoNs .r. amend. V, XIV.
The due process clause does not have a fixed meaning, but generally encompasses the notion
of fundamental fairness. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). The due process clause guarantees that notice and a fair hearing he accorded
to an individual prior to the deprivation of life, liberty or property. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68 (1932). See also Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (due process is not a technical formula, but instead represents "a profound
attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and
government"); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915) (as long as notice and hearing or an
opportunity to be heard is provided, the clue process clause is satisfied).
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speedy trial and counsel rights. 46 Although the District Court for the Central District of
California denied the Gouveia group's motion, 17 the district court allowed the Mills
group's motion and dismissed their indictments. 48 On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the Mills group's indictment
and remanded the case for trial." Both groups of inmates were eventually tried and
found guilty of murder. 5°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, proceeding en bane,
consolidated the appeals of the Gouveia and Mills groups to consider whether, under
any circumstances, a federal inmate suspected of a prison crime and placed in ADU is
constitutionally entitled to an attorney prior to the return of an indictment. 51 The court
of appeals held that the inmates' sixth amendment counsel rights had been violated. 52
According to the court, any detention which exceeds the maximum period recommen-
dations in the prison regulations, 53 and is persisting due to a pending criminal investi-
gation, requires the appointment of counse1.54 The court of appeals therefore reversed
the judgments of the lower courts and dismissed the earlier indictments. 55 Subsequently,
the government filed a petition for certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court. 56
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and held that the right
to counsel does not attach until the initiation of formal proceedings by the state."
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. The sixth amendment guarantees the right to a speedy and
public trial, as well as the assistance of counsel to aid in preparing a defense. U.S. CONS,'. amend.
VI.
" Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. The district court pointed out the distinction between adminis-
trative procedures and indictment. The rights which attach at indictment do not attach at the time
of disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the court denied the motion to dismiss. Id.
48 Joint Appendix for the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 170-180, United States v. Gouveia,
104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). The district court concluded that when Mills and Pierce were placed in
ADU, the "finger of suspicion" had already been pointed toward them. Id. at 180. According to
the court, the government's refusal to appoint counsel or some other neutral investigator irreparably
damaged the defendants ability to prepare for trial. Id. Also, the court determined that the
segregation in ADU bore all the indicia of a criminal arrest and thus, must be viewed as such. Id.
49 United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981). In reversing
the lower court, the court of appeals reasoned that segregation in ADU does not constitute an
arrest or accusation for speedy trial purposes. Id. at 787. Thus, if a defendant is not accused, the
counsel guarantee is inapplicable. Id. at 788.
so Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295-96. After a four week trial of the Gouveia group which ended
in a mistrial, the inmates were re-tried and found guilty. The Gouveia group defendants were
sentenced to consecutive life and ninety-nine year prison terms. Id. at 2295. The Mills group was
found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 2296.
51 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1117.
62 See id. at 1123-25. The court of appeals analyzed the issue as one of first impression, unique
to the prison setting. The court determined that the point of accusation was different for prison
crimes. Id. at 1120. According to the court, ADU confinement can serve an accusatory function
when the detention is related to subsequent prosecution. Id. at 1124. The court stated that con-
finement in ADU functioned much like an arrest outside of prison. Thus, the court concluded that
"No insist that an inmate is not 'accused' until formal charges are initiated is to ignore reality." Id.
at 1122.
u 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.11, 541.13 (1984) set out sanctions for offenses committed in prison.
" Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1125.
55 Id, at 1127.
56 1 04 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
57 104 S. Ct. at 2298, 2300.
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In holding that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of formal
adversary proceedings, Gouveia represents a significant restriction of a guarantee which
the Court has "deemed necessary to insure [the] fundamental human rights of life and
liberty."58 As a consequence of this decision, the Court has virtually precluded sixth
amendment scrutiny of any preindictment confrontations, regardless of the violation
alleged. Although earlier sixth amendment jurisprudence had indicated that counsel's
assistance is guaranteed "whenever necessary to assure a meaningful `defence,'" 59 the
Gouveia Court continued a recent trend of narrowly defining the applicability of the
counsel guarantee.° Moreover, as a result of the Gouveia decision, the sixth amendment
counsel guarantee offers little protection in the prison context. Even though a prison
inmate is confronted with government forces from the first moment he is suspected of
committing a prison crime, these confrontations will never have sixth amendment sig-
nificance if the prisoner has not been formally indicted.
This casenote submits that the attachment of the right to counsel only at or after
formal judicial proceedings is an elevation of form over substance which is contrary to
the spirit of the sixth amendment. In support of this assertion this casenote will begin
by outlining the history of the counsel guarantee. Against this historical background, the
reasoning of the Gouveia Court is presented. This casenote then argues that the me-
chanical rule applied by the Court in Gouveia frustrates the purpose of the right to
counsel guarantee because that right is designed to protect an individual's right to a fair
trial, which cannot be achieved through application of the Gouveia rule. Next, the
underlying motivations of the Gouveia Court will be explored to determine some possible
reasons why the Court reaffirmed the bright-line test established in earlier case law. It
is contended that protection of the right to a fair trial cannot be adequately ensured by
a rule which creates an arbitrary dividing line at the initiation of formal proceedings by
the state. Such an arbitrary line disallows counsel's assistance at a confrontation where
that assistance would be required if an individual had been formally accused. The
inequity which the Gouveia standard imposes on the accused inmate will then be analyzed.
As a substitute for the mechanical rule of Gouveia, this casenote will propose a three-
part test which uses prior Supreme Court precedent to balance the Gouveia Court's
practical concerns with the mandate of the sixth amendment to determine when the
right to counsel should attach. Finally, this new standard will be applied to the facts
presented in Gouveia to demonstrate when the right to counsel should have attached to
protect these inmates' right to a fair trial.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COUNSEL GUARANTEE
A. Interpretation and Expansion of the Guarantee: 1932-1967
The 1932 Supreme Court decision, Powell v. Alabama, marked the beginning of the
interpretation of the sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee." In Powell, the Court
58
 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1937).
59 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
6° Kirby v, Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The Gouveia Court continued this narrowing of the
scope of the counsel guarantee despite language in a post Kirby decision indicating the possibility
that the counsel guarantee could, in appropriate situations, attach at earlier points in time. Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). See also Note, The Right to Co-tinsel, supra note 3, at 840 n.223.
61 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932). The Court commenced its interpretation of the
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was presented with the appeal of nine defendants convicted of a capital offense.62 When
the defendants were arraigned, the trial court appointed "all members of the bar" for
the purpose of arraignment." Because no individual attorney had been appointed,
however, when the trial date arrived the defendants had not met with counsel nor
prepared any sort of defense." Recognizing that criminal defendants had a vital need
for legal advice during the pretrial phase of a prosecution, the Court held that the
defendants' sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated and thus, reversed the
judgment of the lower court. 66
Fundamental to the Powell Court's sixth amendment analysis was the recognition
that at critical stages of the prosecution, an accused has a right to counse1. 66 Although
the Court did not define when a stage is critical, it found that the need for counsel was
particularly necessary in the period from arraignment to trial, "when consultation,
thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important." 67 After reviewing
the English common law rule and the colonial alteration of the English rule regarding
the right to counsel, 68 the Court determined that it is not sufficient to give a defendant
his day in court without providing both the accused and his attorney time to prepare
for trial." In conclusion, the Court found that protection of the fundamental right
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings" against an
accused."
Eight years after Powell, the Court continued this general expansion of the counsel
guarantee in Avery v. Alabama." In Avery, the Court again addressed the question of
counsel guarantee in the context of the due process clause because Powell was a state prosecution
and the sixth amendment, at that time, applied only to actions of the federal government. Id. at
66. The due process clause is a broad protection generally providing fundamental fairness and
specifically requiring notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing. Id. According to the Court, the
counsel guarantee is encompassed in this notion of a fair hearing because the right to a hearing
means the right to be heard through counsel. Id. at 68-69. See Note, Counsel During Interrogation,
supra note 8, at 1004. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the
due process clause.
62 Powell, 287 U.S. at 49. The defendants were nine black men charged with raping two white
women. The jury found the defendants guilty and they were sentenced to death. Id. at 50-51.
• Id. at 49. It is unclear from the decision how or why the trial judge appointed all members
of the bar. The effect seems to be that no individual attorney was appointed as counsel and
consequently no trial preparation was undertaken. Id.
64 Id. at 53-56.
• Id. at 73.
66 Id. at. 57.
0 Id.
69 Id. at 60. In England, the lawyer's role was merely to advise his clients in . matters of law, but
take no responsibility for matters of fact. Id. Moreover, the right to counsel was limited to misde-
meanors and the felony of treason. Id. For any other felony, the accused could consult with an
attorney only for legal questions which the accused himself suggested. Id. The sixth amendment
was derived from colonial statutes and constitutions which were designed to reject the English
common law rule. Id. at 61. See also W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS
(1955).
69 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
" Id.
"1 308 U.S. 444 (1940). Prior to Avery, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst further defined and
expanded the right to counsel guarantee in recognizing that "the average defendant does not have
the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take
his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel." 304
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when counsel must be appointed." Although the Court determined that the attorneys
in Avery had been appointed at a pretrial stage which allowed them enough time to
prepare their client's case, the Court warned that appointment of counsel under circum-
stances which do not allow counsel a chance to prepare a defense would contravene the
sixth amendment." Avery, therefore, demonstrated the Court's determination to ensure
that counsel is appointed at a meaningful time to protect the most basic right of a
criminal defendant. 74 This same concern is evidenced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 75 where
the Court incorporated the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amendment and held
that defendants in state criminal prosecutions were guaranteed the assistance of coun-
sel."
Following this general expansion of the counsel guarantee, the Court began during
the early 1960's to define the "critical stage" standard. Initially, the Court analyzed
"critical" in terms of the stage of proceedings against an individual." The Court defined
"critical" on a case by case basis, never really setting out a test to determine if a stage
was critical. After defining preliminary hearing," arraignment," and indictment 89 as
critical stages, the Court moved away from defining "critical" in terms of the court
proceedings and developed a more general, informal accusatory standard. In the 1964
decision of Escobedo v. Illinois, 81 the Court addressed the issue of whether the refusal by
police to honor the defendant's request to consult with his attorney during the course
U.S. 45H, 462-63 (1938). Moreover, the Court determined that the right to appointed counsel was
demanded by the counsel guarantee if the accused could not afford counsel. Id. at 463.
72 Avery, 308 U.S. at 445.
"Id. at 446. The Court stated that "the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer,
to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel
into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that
an accused be given the assistance of counsel." Id.
Avery involved an individual convicted for murder. Avery's attorneys moved for continuance
before the trial on the basis that they did not have adequate time to prepare. Id. at 447-48. The
trial court denied the motion and the defendant was found guilty. Id. at 448. On appeal, the
Supreme Court found that the attorneys did have sufficient time to prepare the case, present a
defense and even bring an appeal to the state supreme court. Id. at 450. The Court found that the
attorneys performed their "full duty intelligently and well." Id.
"Id. at 446.
75 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
76 Id. at 339 (Court held that the right to counsel is a fundamental right applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in all criminal cases where the defendant is faced with the
possibility of incarceration). Gideon overruled a prior Supreme Court decision, Betts v, Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462 (1942), in which the Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not require the
states to provide counsel to protect a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 342. Gideon was one of
several cases during the 1960's in which a wide range of rights that had previously only been
available to defendants in federal courts were extended to defendants in state prosecutions. See also
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by jury); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967) (right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to
confrontation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule).
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (indictment); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963) (preliminary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment).
78 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,60 (1963).
" Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961).
B5 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
81 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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of an interrogation constitutes a denial of the right to counsel in violation of the sixth
amendment." At the time of Escobedo's request for counsel, he had not been formally
indicted. 83 The Court stated that formal accusation or indictment was not a prerequisite
to the attachment of the right to counse1. 8  Although the Court recognized that there
were no formal proceedings, it noted that the defendant, through the actions of the
police, had become the accused.'" The Court added that lilt would exalt form over
substance to make the right to counsel ... depend on whether at the time of interrog-
ation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment." 88 The practical effect of the
government's actions, the Court explained, was to charge the defendant with a crime
without formal proceedings.87 Thus, the Court held that when the process ceases to be
investigatory and the focus is directed at one individual, the adversary system has begun
to operate." Therefore, the accused must he permitted to consult with his attorney at
that time."
Two years after Escobedo, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona" changed its approach in
confession/interrogation cases. Instead of relying on the sixth amendment counsel guar-
antee, the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 91
requires counsel's presence during custodial interrogations. 92 Miranda and Escobedo both
addressed the issue of the right to counsel in the interrogation situation. Although both
cases determined that counsel must be provided, Miranda relied on the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, not the sixth amendment counsel clause. Therefore,
Eseobedo's precedential value for the sixth amendment proposition that the right to
counsel attaches at the point in time when the investigation focuses on one individual
became uncertain after Miranda.93 The Court, however, a year after the Miranda decision,
82 Id. at 479. In Escobedo, the defendant was suspected of the murder of his brother-in-law. Id.
The police arrested him and began questioning him. In the meantime, the defendant's mother
called an attorney, who went to the police station. Id. at 480. The attorney requested to speak with
the defendant, but the police refused his requests. Id. at 480-81. Eventually Escobedo made
statements that implicated himself in the murder. Id. at 483.
" id. at 485.
84 Id.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 486.
87 Id.
" Id. at 492.
"9 Id.
99 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
91 Id. at 444. Through history the Court came to recognize that a system which depends on
confessions extracted from an accused in a custodial interrogation tend to be "less reliable and
more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation." Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 489. Therefore, the Court in Miranda an-
nounced three fundamental rules to protect the accused's right against self-incrimination. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444-45. First, before an individual is interrogated, he must be warned of his constitu-
tional rights of silence and counsel. Id. Second, counsel, retained or appointed, must be made
available during interrogation. Id. Finally, the individual may waive both his right to counsel and
his right to remain silent if such waiver is made voluntarily. Id. See also Eisen & Rosett, Protections
for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLum. L. REV. 645, 646 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Eisen & Rosen].
92 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
98 See Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. Rev. 399, 404 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Pretrial Right]. Some commentators have speculated that Miranda may have implicitly
overruled Escobedo's sixth amendment basis for expanding the right to counsel to cover the prein-
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cited Escobedo as support in another sixth amendment right to counsel case." This fact
alone may indicate that the Court still regarded Escobedo as sixth amendment precedent
for the proposition that the right to counsel may attach in preindictment situations."
The peak of the growth of the counsel guarantee occurred in 1967 with the trilogy
of line -up cases: United States v. Wacle, 96
 Gilbert v. California," and Stovall v. Denno." Wade
involved an individual who was indicted for hank robbery." Two weeks after counsel
had been appointed by the court to represent Wade, the FBI, without providing notice
to Wade's counsel, arranged to have two bank employees observe a line-up including
the defendant.m The employees identified the defendant and subsequently made an in-
court identification of the defendant.'°' 'The Court concluded that this line-up was a
critical stage in the prosecution since it was fraught with dangers which may render a
fair trial impossible.'" Because the defendant was subjected to this uncounseled line-up,
the Court determined that the in-court identification must be excluded.'" The Wade
Court stated that the protection afforded by the right to counsel can he accomplished
only if "the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial."'" The Wade Court concluded
that scrutiny of any pretrial confrontation which takes place without the assistance of
counsel is necessary to preserve a criminal defendant's most basic right to a fair trial. 105
In Wade, the critical stage standard was broadly defined as any stage where "potential
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres."'m
Gilbert, like Wade, involved a line-up conducted without notice to counsel sixteen
days after defendant had been indicted and counsel had been appointed. 107 The Gilbert
Court followed the reasoning in Wade and held that the in-court identifications must be
excluded if the witness did not have a basis, independent from the uncounseled line-up,
dictment custodial interrogation. Id. Instead, a fifth amendment basis for the expansion may have
been substituted through Miranda. Id. See Eisen & Rosett, supra note 91, at 665 (if any sixth
amendment right to counsel stemming from Escobedo survived Miranda, it lacks definition). See also
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220,232-33 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist stated
that the primary purpose of Escobedo was not to guarantee the right to counsel, but like Miranda,
to guarantee the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
" United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,225-26 (1967). The Court, in citing Escobedo for the
sixth amendment proposition that the right to counsel attaches at critical stages of the prosecution,
appeared to be indicating that Escobedo was not overruled or subsumed by Miranda. See id.
93 See id.
96 3 88 U.S. 218 (1967).
97 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
96 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
99 Wade, 388 U.S. at 220.
LOS Id.
ID , Id
102 Id. at 235-37.
1 03 Id. at 239-40.
," Id. at 226.
, D5 Id. at 227.
106 Id. The Court remanded the case to give the government an opportunity to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications had an independent origin from the
illegal line-up. Id. at 240. If these identifications did not have an independent source, the defendant
must be granted a new trial. Id.
107 Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 269.
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to identify the defendant.'" Gilbert therefore firmly established the Wade "per se exclu-
sionary" rule, which requires the exclusion at trial of evidence resulting from uncoun-
seled identifications, and applied this rule to state proceedings. 109
In the third case of the line-up trilogy, Stovall, the Court addressed the question
whether the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule should be extended retroactively."°
Stovall involved the stabbing of a husband and wife in their home."' The husband died,
and the wife was in the hospital in critical condition when the police brought the suspect
to her hospital bed.'" The suspect had not been formally arraigned nor did he have the
assistance of counsel at this "show-up." 113 After the victim identified the suspect as her
assailant at the hospital, she also made an in-court identification. " 4 The Court considered
whether the in-court identification should be excluded because the defendant was un-
assisted by counsel at the initial identification.'" Instead of focusing on the lack of formal
accusation, the Court detailed the aspects of the procedure containing the potential for
irreparable prejudice.'" The Court, however, held that the Wade rule would be applied
only prospectively.'" The Court explained that law enforcement officials had operated
on the great weight of authority that counsel was not required at preindictment con-
frontations of this sort. "A Law enforcement officials had no way to suspect that the Court
would change this rule." 9 Therefore, because the retroactive application of the Wade
rule would be more disruptive than helpful, the Court declined to extend the rule to
cover this preindictment confrontation.'"
In the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall decisions, the Supreme Court demonstrated that
the definition of the "critical stage" standard is not contingent on any formal proceeding.
Instead, the Court concluded that the Wade rule encompasses any confrontation, formal
or informal, where the potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights
inheres."' In all three of these cases the Court recognized that a functional analysis of
counsel guarantee questions is required to protect an individual's right to a fair trial.
I" Id. at 272. The Court remanded the case to the California Supreme Court to determine two
issues. The first issue was whether the witness had a basis, independent of the line-up, to identify
the defendant. Second, if the witness did not have an independent basis, the lower court was to
assess whether admission of the identification amounted to harmless error. Id.
WS Id. at 273.
"° Stovall, 388 U.S. at 294.
"I Id. at 295.
1121d.
73 Id. A "show-up" involves a one-on-one identification of a suspect by a victim or witness.
/14
" 5 Id. at 296.
116 Id. at 295-99.
117 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296. Because the accused was denied the benefit of the Wade-Gilbert rule,
the Court continued its analysis by questioning whether the confrontation was so suggestive and
conducive to "irreparable mistaken identification" as to be a violation of the due process clause, Id.
at 301-02. Because the only witness was in the hospital, near death, a police station line-up was out
of the question. Id. at 302. The only feasible alternative was this immediate hospital confrontation.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the due process rights of the accused had not been violated.
See infra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
118
	
388 U.S. at 299.
119 1d.
' 20 Id, at 300.
PSI Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. After these three cases were decided, most lower courts construed
them broadly and held the right to counsel applicable to preindictment confrontations. See Wilson
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B. Restriction of the Counsel Guarantee: Kirby v. Illinois
In 1972, the Court radically departed from the functional analysis used in its past
right to counsel cases in the plurality opinion of Kirby v. Illinois.' 22 Kirby involved a
preindictment show-up at the police station where the victim identified the defendant.'"
The defendant argued that the Court should extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary
rule to this preindictment confrontation.' 24
 Without any scrutiny of the confrontation,
the Court simply held that their prior cases "firmly established" 125 that the right to
counsel attaches only at or after adversary proceedings have been initiated. 126
 The Kirby
plurality did not deny that the preindictment line-up may be critical to the defense of a
criminal case and may result in irreparable prejudice. The Court, however, simply stated
that the defendant has no right to counsel until the government formally commences
suit. 127
 Concluding that the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is the starting point
of the adversary system of criminal justice, the Court reasoned that only then is the
accused faced with the prosecutorial forces and the technicalities of the law. 128 As support
for this proposition, the Court found it significant that the majority of prior cases
addressing the counsel issue involved postindictment confrontations. L'21' Therefore, the
Court determined that only with the formal initiation of criminal proceedings will the
sixth amendment guarantee attach."°
Although the Kirby plurality stated that it was not departing from the rationale of
the Wade line of cases,"' Kirby does not follow the spirit of those cases.'" Kirby continued
v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972). The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that, although the line-ups in Wade and Gilbert were conducted after indictment and
the line-up in Wilson occurred before the accused had been formally charged, "surely the assistance
of counsel does not arise or attach because of the return of an indictment." Id. at 144. The
Court noted that all the reasons supporting the Wade decision are equally compelling in the
preindictment situation. Id. See also United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.
3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254
N.E.2d 427 (1970).
122 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See also id. at 691-705 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, The State Responses
to Kirby v. United States [sic], 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 423, 434 [hereinafter cited as Note, The State
Responses] (Kirby deviated from precedent in applying a rigid distinction between preindictment and
postindictment cases).
i25 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 684.
'24 See id. at 685-86.
L26 Id. at 688. The Court's statement regarding what past cases have "firmly established" is
particularly puzzling in that Justice Stewart, the author of the Kirby opinion, notes in his concurring/
dissenting opinion of Wade that as a result of the Wade holding the right to counsel attaches in
certain confrontations whether before or after indictment. Wade, 388 U.S. at 251 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Justice Stewart noted at the outset of Kirby that the applicability of Wade and
Gilbert to preindictment confrontations has severely divided the courts. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 687 n.5.
128 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
' 27 Id. at 689.
12A
128 Id. at 688. Historically, the majority of cases addressing the counsel guarantee involved
postindictment confrontations. See, e.g., Wade, 388 U.S. at 219 (postindictment line-up); Powell, 287
U.S. at 50 (trial). But, the types of cases in which the issue has arisen should not dictate when the
right attaches. They are irrelevant to the inquiry that a court must make in each different fact
pattern.
' 5" Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690.
$ 1 Id.
192
 Id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan concluded that the majority had refused to
July 1985]	 CASENOTES	 1041
to repeat the language of Wade when the plurality opinion stated that all pretrial con-
frontations must be scrutinized,' 33 yet, the Court did not scrutinize the show-up in Kirby.
Instead, the Court dismissed the issue by stating that there is no right to counsel until
the initiation of formal proceedings.'" In most situations, where the defendant has
already been indicted and is then, for the first time, subject to a confrontation with the
legal system, the right to counsel will attach at that time and the outcome under Kirby
would be no different than under Wade. In the preindictment confrontation, however,
as presented in Kirby, the accused would have no right to counsel according to the Kirby
Court since formal charges had not been filed.'"
After the Kirby decision, the trend of the Court was one of restriction of the sixth
amendment guarantee.' 3° For example, in United States v. Ash,"' the Court held that the
right to counsel does not attach in a postindictment photographic identification of the
defendant.'" The defendant in Ash was indicted for bank robbery.'" In preparing for
trial, the prosecutor showed color photographs to the trial witnesses to determine if they
could make an in-court identification.m This postindictment photographic identification,
without the presence of either the accused or his attorney, was the basis for the defen-
dant's claim that he had been denied the right to counsel at a critical stage in the
prosecution.' 4 ' The Ash Court stated that the right to counsel had been extended to
pretrial situations because a "trial-like" confrontation had been involved.' 12 Because the
recognize the principles of the Wade-Gilbert line of cases. Id. See also Note, The Pretrial Right, supra
note 93, at 413 (Kirby pays only "lip service" to the functional analysis of Wade and Gilbert); Note,
The State Responses, supra note 122, at 434 (Kirby varies from the Wade-Gilbert rationale).
'" Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690-91.
'" Id. at 688.
"s See Note, The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 822 (under Kirby an accused has no right to
the assistance of counsel at a corporeal identification which occurs before the filing of formal
charges, despite the critical nature of the confrontation). Commentators have criticized the Kirby
decision. See id. at 823 (the author finds Kirby inadequate protection for the right to counsel); Note,
The State Responses, supra note 122, at 436 (Kirby's formalistic approach offers only "an illusory
protection to the accused"). The California Supreme Court, along with a few other state courts,
have either explicitly rejected or questioned Kirby. See, e.g., People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88,
102, 634 P.2d 927, 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 585 (1981) (based on the California Constitution,
the right to counsel encompasses preindictment line-ups); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338,
217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974) (before and after the commencement of formal proceedings, a suspect
is entitled to be represented by counsel at line-up identifications or photographic identifications);
State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (the principles of Wade and Gilbert should
apply to a preindictment, post-arrest line-up, especially when the investigation has focused on one
individual as the suspect). See also infra note 2 i 1 and accompanying text.
136 Despite this trend, the Court slightly expanded the scope of the sixth amendment guarantee
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972), in holding that a criminal defendant, tried for a
petty offense which carries a penalty of incarceration, has a right to counsel just as one who is
facing more serious charges has that right. But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979)
(the Court restricted Argersinger to apply only to crimes in which the defendant is actually threatened
with imprisonment).
'" 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
L" Id. at 321.
"9 1d. at 302.
Id. at 303.
'4' Id.
142 Id. at 317.
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Court concluded that a photographic session was not particularly trial-like, it found that
the right to counsel did not apply." 3
Most of the cases between Kirby and Gouveia involved postindictment confrontations.
In these cases, the Court consistently followed the Kirby test that if the defendant was
confronted by the forces of the state without the assistance of counsel after the initiation
of formal proceedings, that individual had been denied his sixth amendment right to
counsel. 144 The Court did not, however, directly address the issue of whether the Kirby
rule applied to all preindicunent confrontations. In Brewer v. Williams, 145 the Court
seemed to fluctuate on the issue of the applicability of the Kirby rule to preindietment
confrontations. 146 The Brewer Court, reaffirming the reasoning of the Powell and Wade.
Courts, emphasized the indispensable nature of the counsel guarantee to the adversary
system of criminal justice. 147 Moreover, the Court stated that:
Where has occasionally been a difference of opinion within the Court as to
the peripheral scope of this constitutional right .... Whatever else it may
mean, the right to counsel ... means at least that a person is entitled to the
help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him ... . 148
Thus, prior to Gouveia, it was not clear whether Kirby represented a general rule from
which certain preindictment exceptions could he carved, or whether it had established
an inflexible rule applicable to all cases. 149
"3 See it at 317-18. This notion of trial-like confrontations does not seem consistent with Wade
in that a line-up is not particularly trial-like. The defendant is confronted neither with legal questions
nor legal intricacies, yet the Wade Court found that the right to counsel attached because counsel
could lessen the impact of any potential prejudice to defendant's right to a fair trial. Wade, 388
U.S. at 236-37,
" 4 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981) (the testimony of a psychiatrist was excluded by
the Court because he interviewed the defendant, at the state's order, after indictment, without the
assistance of counsel); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229 (1977) (the Moore Court found that a
defendant, identified by his victim at a preliminary hearing without the aid of counsel, had been
deprived of his right to counsel).
" 5 430 U.S. 387 (1977). This case involved the kidnapping of a child on Christmas Eve. Id. at
390. The police immediately suspected the defendant. Id. Prior to arrest, the defendant contacted
his attorney, who advised him to turn himself in, but not to say anything to the police. Id. The
defendant followed his attorney's advice. Id. After arraignment and advice by a second attorney
not to say anything to the police, the defendant got into the police car to return to the town where
he was from, 160 miles away. Id. at 391-92. Despite the defendant's requests and Isis attorney's
instructions to the police not to interrogate the defendant, the police engaged in a subtle form of
questioning, capitalizing on the defendant's strong religious beliefs. Id. This subtle questioning
technique was called the "Christian burial speech," which eventually prompted the defendant to
incriminate himself by talking about his murder of the child and leading the police to her body. Id.
at 392-93. The Court found that this procedure violated the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel. Id. at 401.
' 46 Id. at 398.
i" Id.
"8 Id.
149 See Note, The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 840 n.233. The author stated that the Brewer
language seemed to leave open the possibility that the right to counsel could attach sooner than
the initiation of formal proceedings. Id.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN GOUVEIA
A. The Majority's Approach
In United States v. Gouveia, 15" the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel does
not attach at any point during a prolonged preindictment segregation of inmates con-
fined in administrative detention. 15 ' Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six member majority,
reached this decision by analyzing the specific wording of the sixth amendment
guarantee' 59 in conjunction with the Court's prior precedent interpreting the counsel
guarantee.' 55 Through this analysis, the Court determined that the court of appeals had
departed from the long standing interpretation of the sixth amendment when the court
held that the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel prior to the formal
intiation of adversary proceedings.'"
The Court began its analysis by summarizing its prior cases regarding the right to
counsel, stating that "our cases have long recognized that the right to counsel attaches
only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant."'"
Relying on Kirby, and the cases following it, the majority found that these past cases
construing the right to counsel were consistent with the literal language of the sixth
amendment because the amendment specifically requires both a "criminal prosecution"
and an "accused."'" Additionally, the Court recognized that its prior decisions protect
the core purpose of the sixth amendment — providing an accused with aid at trial.'"
According to the Court, trial is the primary point in time in which the accused is
confronted with the legal system and the prosecutor, therefore, trial is the point at which
the accused needs aid.' 59 To provide an accused this assistance at trial, the majority noted
that the right to counsel has been extended to some "critical" pretrial proceedings.' 59
This extension of the counsel guarantee has occurred, the Court explained, because
certain pretrial proceedings involve trial-like confrontations with the adversary or the
legal system, the outcome of which could determine the accused's fate well before the
actual trial.' 60 Therefore, in conclusion, the Court determined that attachment of the
right to counsel at the initiation of formal proceedings is appropriate because only then
has the government definitely determined that it will prosecute, resulting in the solidi-
fication of the adverse positions of the government and the accused.' 6 '
155 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984).
tr" Id. at 2298, 2300.
I" Id. at 2297. Prior to its analysis, the majority presented the holding and the reasoning of
the court of appeals. The majority's interpretation of the court of appeals' opinion will be presented
after the majority's reasoning is discussed. See infra notes 162-172 and accompanying text.
1 " 104 S. Ct. at 2297-98.
1 ." Id. at 2298-99.
1 " Id. at 2297.
15" Id. at 2298. Of course, as Justice Stevens pointed out, those cases which reaffirm Kirby's
holding did not present preindictment right to counsel questions, Instead they were merely postin-
dictinent confrontations in which the Court held that the Kirby plurality's test of initiation of formal
proceedings had been satisfied. See id. at 2302 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1,7 Id. at 2298.
' 58 Id.
l59 Id.
16° Id.
161 Id.
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Analyzing the appeals court's reasoning, the majority noted that the court of appeals
had evaluated the case as a prison case, and therefore not controlled by Kirby. 162 Because
the lower court analogized the right to counsel claim presented by Gouveia to another
sixth amendment guarantee, the speedy trial right, the Court noted that the lower court
had concluded that the counsel guarantee, like the speedy trial right, could be triggered
by situations other than indictment.'" The majority characterized this analogy as "inapt,"
remarking that the basic protections afforded by each of these guarantees is very dif-
ferent.'" According to the Court, the right to counsel protects an accused during trial-
like confrontations with the prosecutor, while the speedy trial right protects an individ-
ual's liberty interest.'" The Court therefore concluded that the court of appeals' analogy
was simply "not relevant to a proper determination of when the right to counsel at-
taches." 166
Through its analysis of the lower court opinion, the Court discussed the court of
appeals' underlying concern with the facts presented in Gouveia. The Ninth Circuit
recognized that because an inmate suspected of a crime is already in prison, the prose-
cution has little motivation to initiate the adversary proceedings promptly. 167 Without
some formal initiation of proceedings, the court of appeals concluded that the govern-
ment could unnecessarily delay formal proceedings and prevent the attachment of the
right to counsel.'" Therefore, the court of appeals was concerned that inmates would
find the preindictment delay particularly prejudicia1. 269 The Court acknowledged that
this concern was a legitimate one, but did not find the appropriate remedy embodied in
the sixth amendment counsel guarantee.'" Instead, the Court looked to the protections
provided by relevant statutes of limitations and the fifth amendment due process clause
as sufficient in the preindictment delay situation presented by the Gouveia case."' Al-
though application of the due process clause and the statutes of limitations did not
change the outcome in the Gouveia case, the Court concluded that these protections were
sufficient in all preindictment delay situations and therefore held that the lower court
was incorrect in formulating a new extension of the counsel guarantee to protect accused
inmates.'"
B. The Concurring Opinion
In a separate opinion joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens rejected the ma-
jority's interpretation of the right to counsel, but concurred in the judgment of the
' 62 /d. at 2296.
183
 Id. at 2299.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 2300.
170 .Id. at 2299.
171 Id. at 2300. Statutes of limitation protect against the bringing of "stale criminal charges." Id.
Due process requires the dismissal of an indictment, regardless of the statutes of limitations, if a
defendant can prove that the preindictment delay was used by the government to gain an advantage
over him and that this delay caused him actual prejudice, Id.
172 Id. The Court remanded the case to the lower court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Id.
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Court."3 The concurring opinion asserted that the Court had in the past consistently
found that "the right to counsel might under some circumstances attach prior to the
formal initiation of judicial proceedings." 174 The concurrence therefore stated that the
majority's broad holding that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation
of formal proceedings was both "unjustified" and "unnecessary" in this case.'"
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's opinion was inconsistent with the Court's
prior opinions in both the Escobedo 176 and Miranda'" cases. In Escobedo, according to the
concurring justice, the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
can attach prior to the filing of formal charges.'" Moreover, Justice Stevens highlighted
the recognition in Miranda that the true beginning of the adversarial process is custodial
interrogation, not the return of a formal indictment.'"
Next, the concurring opinion assessed past sixth amendment precedent and deter-
mined that the attachment of the counsel guarantee turns on the nature of the confron-
tations between the individual and the government, not on the timing of these confron-
tations.'" According to Justice Stevens, until Gouveia, the Court had adhered to the basic
test of examining an event, regardless of whether a formal indictment had been returned,
to determine whether an individual had become an "accused" who needed aid in dealing
with his adversary or the legal system. 13 ' The concurring opinion found that the sixth
amendment protections were available to an individual once he became an accused,
whether formally or informally. 182 Justice Stevens added that the events transforming
an individual into an "accused" can occur in various situations prior to the return of a
formal indictment. L83 According to Justice Stevens, "when a person is deprived of liberty
in order to aid the prosecution in its attempt to convict him, . , . that person is ... 'an
accused"" and the counsel guarantee attaches.'"
The concurring justices, however, joined in the Court's opinion because they did
not find that the prolonged confinement in administrative detention served an accusa-
torial function.'" Justice Stevens concluded that the defendants were placed in ADU
because of the security risk which they posed to the general prison population.'" Thus,
I " Id. at 2300-01 (Stevens, J., concurring).
' 74 Id. at 2300 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurring opinion quotes a recent Supreme Court
case in which the majority concluded that "[wihatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him . . ." Id.
(quoting Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398).
175 Id. at 2300-01 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" fi Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1 " Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
178 104 S. Ct. at 2301 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a discussion of the facts and issues presented
in Escobedo, see supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
' 79 104 S. Ct. at 2301 (Stevens, J., concurring).
188 1d. at 2301-02 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181 Id.
18R Id.
189 See id.
184 Id. at 2303 (Stevens, J., concurring).
183 See id.
156
1 " Id. The concurring justice could find no indication in the record that the purpose of
defendant's segregation was to aid the prosecutorial investigation. Id.
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the concurring justices determined that the detention in ADU was not violative of the
sixth amendment because it was "simply serving legitimate institutional policies."'"
C. The. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the concurrence in its con-
clusion that the majority misinterpreted the development of the sixth amendment juris-
prudence.'" Echoing the concurrence, the dissent pointed out that prior precedent has
recognized that an individual's right to counsel can be triggered before formal proceed-
ings.'" According to Justice Marshall, the government "can transform an individual into
an 'accused' without officially designating him as such through the ritual of arraign-
ment."''''
Justice Marshall, however, disagreed with the concurring opinion in that he found
that the prolonged detention in ADU did serve an accusatorial function. 192 He noted
that the district court found that the prolonged detention was neither a form of prison
discipline nor a result of security concerns.'" Instead, Justice Marshall observed that the
detention was related to the pending criminal investigationi 94 Asserting that the Court
should not review these findings of' fact because no showing of obvious error had been
made, Justice Marshall argued that the inmates in ADU had the right to meet with
counsel prior to the initiation of formal proceedings.'°'
Unlike the majority and concurring opinions, the dissent then moved on to the
second issue presented in Gouveia, whether dismissal of the indictment was the proper
remedy.'" In analyzing this question, the dissent discussed the requirement in United
States v. Morrisoni" that persons seeking dismissal of an indictment must show "de-
monstrable prejudice or substantial threat thereof."'" Justice Marshall concluded that
this requirement was fulfilled because the record revealed a great deal of evidence that
substantial prejudice may have occurred.' 99 Therefore, the dissent would have affirmed
the court of appeals in their dismissal of the indictments. 2"
18B Id.
18" Id. at 2303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
19 ' Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 92 Id.
' 99 Id.
194 Id. Justice Marshall noted that the record from the district court with respect to two of the
defendants stated that, at the time these inmates were placed in ADU, the finger of suspicion "had
already been pointed at them." Id. As the dissenting justice noted, the district court concluded that
ADU was really part of the prosecutorial acts employed against the inmates. Id. Because these were
the findings and conclusions of the district court, Justice Marshall stated that the Supreme Court
should not review them without an obvious showing of error. Id. In this case, according to the
dissenting justice, no error had been shown. Id.
' 9r' Id.
'" Id, at 2309-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because the court of appeals concluded that the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated, the issue of the appropriate
remedy arose. Id. Since the Supreme Court found no sixth amendment violation, the majority did
not address this question.
' 97 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
104 S. Ct. at 2305 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 999 U.S. at 365).
' 99 1d. Justice Marshall relied on the district court's finding that passage of time "resulted in
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II. CRITIQUE OF THE MECHANICAL APPROACH APPLIED BY THE GOUVEIA COURT
A. The Gouveia Decision: A Retreat From Sixth Amendment Precedent
The wooden and mechanical analysis employed by the majority in Gouveia in reach-
ing the holding that the right to counsel does not attach at any point during a prolonged
preindiament administrative detention of inmates is contrary to both the spirit of the
sixth amendment guarantee and the Court's prior cases interpreting that right. The
sixth amendment, as interpreted and applied by the Court through its jurisprudence,
has been declared fundamental to the protection of a criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial. Although the sixth amendment does not dictate when the right attaches, the
Court has recognized in the past that investigation and thorough preparation are nec-
essary ingredients of adequate representation. 2" Thus, the Court, in cases from Powell
through Wade, enunciated a flexible approach to right to counsel questions which did
not hinge on any particular occurrence in the proceedings against an accused.'" The
Court has recognized that balancing the interests in the sound administration of justice
against the defendant's right to a fair trial "will necessarily involve a delicate judgment
based on the circumstances of each case." 203
The critical stage standard set out in Wade was a manifestation of the Court's
willingness to examine any confrontation of the accused with the government or legal
system to determine whether counsel was necessary to preserve the individual's right to
a fair trial. 2°4 The relevant inquiry was not into when the confrontation occurred, as the
majority in Gouveia held, but rather, whether the potential for substantial prejudice to
the defendant's rights inhered in the confrontation. 205 The irrelevance of the timing of
the confrontation is evidenced by the Court's decision in Wade's companion case, Stovall
the irrevocable loss of exculpatory testimony and evidence," thereby fulfilling the Morrison require-
ment of substantial threat of prejudice and requiring dismissal of the indictment. Id.
2°° Id. Justice Marshall did not agree with all of the court of appeals' reasoning on the issue of
prejudice. According to the dissenting justice, the court of appeals departed from Morrison in stating
that in cases of this sort a presumption of prejudice is appropriate because proving prejudice would
be nearly impossible. Id, The dissent did not agree with this "departure" from Morrison, Id. Instead,
justice Marshall found substantial threat of prejudice, which he found sufficient to satisfy the
Morrison standard. Id.
24 ' Powell, 287 U.S. at 57. Powell squarely held that the appointment of counsel must occur at
a point before the trial so as to assure an attorney a meaningful opportunity to investigate the case.
Id.
202 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (Court analyzed "whether potential substantial prejudice to defen-
dant's right inhere[dl in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice"); Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 492 ("when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory,"
the right to counsel attaches); Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (accused needs the assistance of counsel at all
critical stages). The Powell Court recognized that "it is vain to give an accused a day in court, with
no opportunity to prepare for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter any
opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case." Id. at 59 (quoting Commonwealth
v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 173, 148 A. 73, 74 (1929)). See supra notes 61-121 and accompanying text.
2" United States v, Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971). Marion focused on another sixth amend-
ment protection, the speedy trial right. Although the right to counsel and the speedy trial right
protect different interests, much of the interpretation of the two guarantees is similar because they
both involve interpretation of the common phrase "[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused shall
enjoy ...." U.S. CONST, amend, VI.
204 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
ens
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v. Denno. 206
 SlavaII involved a murder suspect identified by his victim in a preindictment
"show-up." 207 Instead of simply holding that the right to counsel does not attach in
preindictment confrontations, the Court emphasized that a significant possibility of
prejudice existed in this type of uncounseled identification. 2" The accused, however,
was denied the benefit of the Wade test because the Court stated that the holding could
not be applied retroactively. 2"
This trend of expansive interpretation of the counsel guarantee was abruptly ter-
minated in Kirby v. Illinois.") Kirby began a new era in the counsel guarantee which has
been characterized by the elevation of form over substance. The Kirby rule provides that
the right to counsel does not attach until the formal initiation of criminal proceedings. 211
The Gouveia decision flows directly from Kirby in simply repeating the Kirby holding and
applying it to the facts presented without an independent evaluation of the differences
296 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
"7 Id. at 295. See supra notes 96-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts
presented in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall line of cases.
200 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 294-95.
700 Id. at 296.
210 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
2 " Id. at 688. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Kirby, commented on the majority's opinion by
stating that "[ill' these propositions do not amount to 'mere formalism,' it is difficult to know how
to characterize them." Id. at 698-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Despite this holding, the Kirby plurality continued to recognize Wade by stating that any pretrial
confrontation must be scrutinized. Id. at 690-91. The Kirby plurality did not attempt to reconcile
the differences in outcome between Kirby and the Wade trilogy of cases. The Kirby Court merely
repeated the Wade dicta approvingly while following a different course. Id. Through Kirby, the
Supreme Court agreed with the position held by a minority of lower courts in interpreting Wade
and Gilbert to apply only after the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. Id. at 688. See
also Note, The Pretrial Right, supra note 93, at 409. Most state and lower federal courts ruling on
the issue prior to Kirby held that the right to counsel attached to all line-up type confrontations,
regardless of the time at which they occurred. See Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972) (line-up confrontations, "riddled with innumerable dangers" cannot
have a constitutional distinction based on the formal initiation of judicial proceedings); United
States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (counsel guarantee is equally applicable to the
informal, pre-arrest confrontation); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 343-44, 461 P.2d 643, 650,
82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (1969) (Stovall reveals that the Court does not intend to limit the operation
of Wade-Gilbert rules to postindictment line-ups).
Moreover, the highest courts in two states, California and Michigan, have rejected Kirby as an
elevation of form over substance. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 100, 634 P.2d 927, 935, 177
Cal. Rptr. 576, 584 (1981) (Kirby's limitation of the right to counsel is a "wholly unrealistic view"
which the court refused to adhere to); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338-39, 217 N.W.2d 22,
27-28 (1974) (pursuant to the court's power to establish rules of evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings in Michigan, the Wade per se exclusionary rule shall apply to all corporeal identifica-
tions, regardless of the formal initiation of adversary proceedings). Because these courts found that
the Kirby opinion was inconsistent with the spirit of the Wade holding, they interpreted their state
constitutions to protect the accused's rights in a manner similar to Wade. Additionally, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, stating that it followed Kirby, held that counsel should be appointed at arrest
since that is the point of commencement of adversary proceedings. Commonwealth v. Richman,
458 Pa. 167, 171-72, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (1974). At least one commentator has noted that in holding
that arrest signals the commencement of formal adversary proceedings, the Pennsylvania court
allowed the counsel guarantee to attach much sooner than the Kirby majority permitted. This
flexible interpretation of Kirby provides much more protection for the accused. Note, The Right to
Counsel, supra note 3, at 822 11.73. See also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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presented in the inmate versus non-inmate situation.212 The Gouveia decision is somewhat
surprising in light of the fact that the Court, four years after Kirby, appeared to be
reconsidering its approach regarding attachment of the counsel guarantee. 212 In Brewer
v. Williams,214 Justice Stewart, the author of the Kirby plurality opinion, and also the
author of the Brewer majority, seemed to recognize that a rule permitting only postin-
dictment attachment of the right to counsel could, in certain situations, be insufficient
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. 2 " Brewer implicitly recognized that although
an individual may not be formally accused, there are many methods by which the
government can render an individual informally accused. 216 The lack of formal accusa-
tion does not prevent prejudicial events from occurring. 217 The appointment of an
attorney after irreparable prejudice has occurred is of little value. Thus, an attorney's
presence is necessary at any stage, regardless of formal accusation, to prevent the
occurrence of abuse and prejudice."'
This door which Brewer appeared to be opening was slammed closed by the Gouveia
majority. 2 " The reaffirmation by the Gouveia majority of the mechanical rule of Kirby
appears to have resulted from the Court's concern with two underlying factors. First,
the Court appears to have been chiefly concerned with ensuring that the application of
the counsel guarantee would not operate to overturn criminal convictions. 220 Second,
the rationale underlying both the Kirby and Gouveia decisions appears to have been the
Court's concern with the practical implementation of a rule which would have allowed
preindictment attachment of the right to coun'sel. The Court ultimately decided to
develop and follow a bright-line test 221 in part because the formulation of a mechanical
212 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2297-99.
215 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398.	 •
2 " 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
216 430 U.S. at 398.
216 Id. at 399 (police deliberately sought to elicit incriminating information during defendant's
isolation from his lawyer just as if police had been formally interrogating defendant). See also
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485 (although petitioner had not been indicted, the petitioner had become
the accused and the purpose of the police questioning was to "get him to confess"); Joint Appendix
for the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 180, United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984)
(district court found that by the time the inmates were committed to administrative detention, "the
finger of suspicion" had been pointed at them).
2 " See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he initiation of adversary ...
proceedings is completely irrelevant to whether counsel is necessary at a pretrial confrontation for
identification in order to safeguard the accused's ... rights to confrontation and effective assistance
of counsel ... .").
215 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 235.
219 This return to the mechanical rule of Kirby was foreshadowed in Justice Rehnquist's con-
curring opinion in Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 233 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice
Rehnquist stated that perhaps the time had arrived to reconsider the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rules
and replace them with a test which would not necessarily result in the exclusion of evidence. Id.
22° See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 424 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (we "must consider society's interest in
the effective prosecution of criminals"); id. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (because the Court
excluded the confession and the subsequent discovery of the body, the guilty party will go free).
See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Mertens & Wasserstrorn, Foreward: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. L.J. 365 (1981); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v.
Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 CoLum. L. REV. 1365 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].
22 ' Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2297; Kirby, 406 U.S. 2088.
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test which allowed the right to counsel to attach at various points in the investigation
would have been much more difficult.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Brewer clearly articulated the dissatisfac-
tion of many members of the Court with the practical effect of the counsel guarantee,
excluding vital evidence, which results in the overturning of criminal convictions. 222 That
dissatisfaction, however, seems to disregard the requirement that the police, as law
enforcement officials, must "scrupulously" follow the commands of the law. 223 The Bill
of Rights requires that facts of a crime be found in a certain way. 224
 As Justice Marshall
stated in his concurring opinion in Brewer, "in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves." 225
 Moreover, the Constitution strikes a balance in favor
of an accused 226
 and while this may not be the most efficient system, it is a system which
allows individuals the most freedom and privacy without compromising the safety and
security of all members of society."' Although application of the counsel guarantee may
work a hardship in an individual case, this hardship is the required trade-off to live in
a society which insures justice in a greater sense for all individuals through preservation
of and respect for the commands of the sixth amendment. 228
In addition to the Court's underlying focus on law and order in society, the practical
implementation of a rule allowing preindicttnent attachment of the right to counsel
seems to have influenced the Gouveia Court to reaffirm the simple, mechanical rule of
Kirby. The first clearly enunciated, yet flexible, test dictating when the right to counsel
attached occurred in Escobedo.229 The dissent in Escobedo appears to have foreshadowed
the current view of the Court that a flexible test is "amorphous and wholly unworka-
ble."23° Preindictment attachment of the counsel guarantee does present certain prob-
lems, including, who will make the determination that a stage is critical and how will the
police know that an individual has become an accused so as to provide counsel when
necessary. Since a court is not usually involved in cases prior to indictment, it seems
inappropriate that a judge should make the determination. In addition, courts are
222
 See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406-09 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 415-29 (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting); id. at 929-38 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 438-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger, in his dissent, cited the famous lines of Justice Cardozo regarding the price that
society pays for the operation of the exclusionary rules: "The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered ... • A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man
is found .... The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free." People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587, 588 (1926).
323
 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 407 (Marshall, J., concurring).
221 Note, Counsel During Interrogation, supra note 8, at 1047.
22 ' Brewer, 430 U.S. at 407 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 320-21 (1959)). Thus, counsel's presence protects the integrity of the adversary system by
preventing suggestive and overreaching conduct on the part of the police, as well as effectuating a
defendant's other sixth amendment rights, such as confrontation and cross-examination. NOte, The
Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 838.
226 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488.
227 See United States v Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3431 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (framers of
the Bill of Rights insisted that law enforcement efforts be restricted in such a manner as to preserve
individual freedom and privacy). See also Stewart, supra note 220, at 1393; Note, Counsel During
Interrogation, supra note 8, at 1047.
228 See Stewart, supra note 220, at 1393.
229
 See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 492.
290 Id. at 496 (White, J., dissenting).
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already extremely crowded. If investigative efforts had to cease until a counsel hearing
could be held, effective criminal investigations would be greatly hampered. Nevertheless,
these practical problems are not insurmountable."' In the most frequently occurring
situation, an individual is not confronted with the forces of government until indictment,
therefore, the right to counsel would not attach until that point. But, in the situation
where the individual undergoes a preindictment confrontation, law enforcement officials
would learn to recognize that an accused must be provided with counsel.°"
The sixth amendment demands a flexible inquiry because many events occur prior
to indictment that could potentially cause irreparable prejudice to a defendant's right to
a fair tria1.253 Although allowing the counsel guarantee to attach in some preindictment
situations may mean some additional costs for the state, 234 the state's investigation and
ultimate criminal conviction would not necessarily be compromised. In fact, as the Wade
Court noted, fear that counsel could "obstruct the course of justice is contrary to basic
assumptions" upon which the adversary system rests. 255 If anything, counsel's presence
at preindictinent confrontations would result in better law enforcement because the use
of tainted evidence could be prevented, thereby protecting both the liberty interest of
the individual and our system of justice by insuring that the innocent avoid conviction
and the guilty are convicted on the basis of accurate and reliable evidence. 256
The Gouveia decision, in addition to reaffirming the bright-line test of Kirby, further
narrowed the scope of the counsel guarantee. The Gouveia Court did not repeat the oft-
quoted lines from Wade regarding scrutiny of any pretrial confrontation. Moreover, the
Gouveia majority stated that "the 'core purpose' of the counsel guarantee is to assure aid
at trial, 'when the accused Psi confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the
advocacy of the public prosecut.or.'"257 No mention is made in Gouveia of the historically
broad purpose of counsel to protect a defendant's right to a fair tria1. 2" Instead, the
Gouveia majority merely stated that the right to counsel exists to protect an accused only
in "trial-type" confrontations with his adversary." 9
Undoubtedly, one facet of the counsel guarantee is to protect an accused in trial-
type confrontations. But, in protecting an accused's most basic right to a fair trial, counsel
23 ' For a discussion of methods to hurdle these practical problems, see infra notes 289-310 and
accompanying text.
232 See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Law enforcement officials recognize when they must
give an individual a Miranda warning. In the same way, law enforcement officials would be respon-
sible to determine when an accused required counsel at critical confrontations.
233 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. See also Note, The Pretrial Right, supra note 93, at 400-03; Note,
Counsel During Interrogation, supra note 8, at 1048-49. The author asserts that when the sixth
amendment was put into effect, the state and the accused did not meet until trial because the
investigative process was in the hands of private individuals. Id. at .1048. Because the investigative
process is now in the hands of the state, the author asserts, the state and the accused meet at much
earlier points in time. Id. Therefore, counsel must be present at these early points to serve their
"traditional role as [aJ buffer against the state." Id. See infra notes 293-310 and accompanying text.
2m Note, Counsel During Interrogation, supra note 8, at 1046-47.
235 Wade, 388 U.S. at 237-38.
236 See Note, The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 840.
237 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 (quoting Ash, 413 U.S. at 309). The Gouveia Court, instead of
quoting the broad language of such decisions as Powell and Wade regarding the many functions of
counsel, cited the language of a recent, fairly restrictive case which disallowed counsel's assistance
at a postindictment photographic identification. See Ash, 403 U.S. at 309-10.
293 Wade, 388 U.S. at 223-24; Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
236 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299.
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performs many functions other than mere protection of an accused during "trial-type"
confrontations.240 If counsel's function was only to protect an accused from the advocacy
of the prosecutor, counsel would not be needed at line-up identifications. As line-ups
are not trial-type confrontations nor are they filled with procedural technicalities 2 41
under Gouveia principles, an accused would have no need for assistance. Yet, prior to
Gouveia, the Court consistently recognized that the accused does have a right to counsel
at these line-ups because the prosecutor may take advantage of the accused without his
awareness, thus prejudicing the accused's right to a fair tria1. 242 The Court has historically
viewed counsel "as being more sensitive to, and aware of, suggestive influences than the
accused himself." 243 Therefore, an accused's counsel is better equipped to reconstruct
the earlier line-up events at tria1. 244 By narrowly defining the function of counsel to
protection of the accused during adversarial confrontations, the majority appears to be
disregarding the many other functions which are vital to the presentation of a meaningful
defense.
Because the Gouveia majority determined that the counsel guarantee was primarily
to assure aid at trial, the defendant's requests for pretrial investigation were characterized
as an attempt to obtain a "pre-indictment private investigator." 245 Although designating
attorneys as "private investigators" may be an unusual assessment of their function, the
Supreme Court since Powell has recognized that pretrial consultation and investigation
are essential ingredients in the preparation of an accused's defense. 246 The Gouveia
majority has departed from past precedent by labeling pretrial investigation as something
other than a vital ingredient to the thorough preparation of an accused's defense. The
Gouveia defendants were not demanding a pretrial private investigator. Instead, they
were merely attempting to preserve their right to a fair trial through pretrial investigation
of the alleged offenses promptly after the incident so that crucial witness testimony and
other evidence would be preserved. 2" By delaying the pretrial investigation nearly two
years, much of this evidence was lost. 248
Finally, the Gouveia majority concluded that the defendants, though not protected
by the sixth amendment right to counsel, were sufficiently protected by the statutes of
limitation and the fifth amendment due process clause P 49 The Court stated that "appli-
2" Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (counsel is vitally important for consultation, investigation and prep-
aration of the defense).
2" See Ash, 413 U.S. at 312 (line-ups do not confront an accused with legal questions, yet counsel
should still be present since counsel is better equipped to re-create the line-up at trial).
242 Id.
245 Id.
2" Id. Ash involved a postindictment photographic identification of an accused. Id. at 300-01.
The Court found that because the accused was not present at the identification, he was not
prejudiced in any way by his lack of familiarity with the law. Id. at 317. Thus, the counsel guarantee
did not attach. Id. at 321. The Court found this photographic display to be merely a part of the
prosecutor's pretrial witness preparation in which defense counsel has never had a right to intervene.
Id. at 317. According to the Court. "[t]he traditional counterbalance in the American adversary
system for these interviews arises from the equal ability of defense counsel to seek and interview
witnesses himself." Id. at 318.
245 104 S. Ct. at 2300. The Court found it impossible to accept this "novel interpretation of the
right to counsel." Id.
246 Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
247
 See Couveia, 704 F.2d at 1122.
240
	 at 1125.
249
 104 S. Ct. at 2300.
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cable statutes of limitations protect against the prosecution bringing stale criminal charges
against any defendant." 25° Yet, because the first degree murder charge involved in
Gouveia is a capital offense, no statute of limitations applies. 25 ' Thus, the Gouveia defen-
dants were not provided any protection by that provision.
The Court also cryptically referred to the fifth amendment due process clause as
protection for the Gouveia defendants. 252 Yet, the Court never set out how this clause
operates to protect the defendants. Instead, the Court merely laid out the standard for
proving due process violations. This standard, according to the Gouveia Court, requires
a showing of actual prejudice and intentional delay on the part of the government. 255
This standard, however, is extremely difficult to meet. For example, if an accused is
claiming actual prejudice because witnesses' memories have dimmed or witnesses have
died or disappeared resulting from the delay on the part of the government, whether
intentional or not, discerning whether the individual has been actually prejudiced is
nearly impossible. The testimony is not what it would have been had the defense counsel
been permitted to investigate promptly. Moreover, knowledge of what the witnesses
would have said or the effect of this testimony on the jury is impossible to determine.
The due process clause is a broad protection which is generally meant to ensure
fairness in the adversary process. 254 The basic requirements of procedural due process
are met if an individual is provided notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing.255
Although the Court initially began analyzing the right to counsel as a component of the
due process requirement of a fair hearing, 256 due process is not an adequate substitute
for the numerous protections provided by the sixth amendment counsel guarantee.
While due process generally protects the reliability and fairness of a proceeding, the
right to counsel protects reliability and fairness, as well as many other rights of an
accused. 257 Counsel ensures that an accused's right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses is protected. 258 In addition, counsel preserves many defenses available to an
accused through witness interviews and discovery of favorable evidence. Therefore, an
attorney at the pretrial stage can prevent the occurrence of abuse. The protection pro-
vided by due process, on the other hand, is an "after the fact" remedy because the event
complained of has already occurred and the accused, on appeal, is arguing that his due
process rights were violated. 5° As the Wade Court noted, counsel's presence is necessary
to effectuate the defendant's first line of defense — "the prevention of unfairness and
the lessening of the hazards" 26° which the defendant might encounter in the pretrial
stages. Due process has only a "retrospective application."26 ' Thus, neither the protec-
252 Id.
25 ' See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1982) ("An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be
found at any time without limitation ... .").
252 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300.
2,3 Id. See also U.S. v. Marion, 904 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
254
	
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
2ss Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915).
256 Powell, 287 U.S. at 67-69.
257 Note, The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 827 (right to counsel protects the accused's right
to confrontation, cross-examination and preparation of a defense).
258
	 388 U.S. at 227, 235.
259 See Note, The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 830.
26° Wade, 388 U.S. at 235.
26l
	 The Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 831.
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tions of the statutes of limitations or the due process clause adequately guard against
the problems envisioned by the sixth amendment.
B. Gouveia Renders the Protection of the Sixth Amendment Worthless in the Prison Context
In addition to retreating significantly from sixth amendment precedent, Gouveia
effectively nullifies the right to counsel protection in the prison setting. Sixth amendment
protections attach only if there is both an accused and a prosecution. 262 The Gouveia
Court held that in the prison context, administrative detention of an inmate was not
sufficient to fulfill the accused requirement of the sixth amendment until a formal
indictment had been returned.263 Therefore, despite the many protections provided a
criminal defendant by the sixth amendment, none of them will be of any value to an
accused inmate until the government decides to formally initiate proceedings.
In assessing the role that the sixth amendment assumes in and out of court, an
evaluation of the extreme differences between the inmate and the non-inmate situations
is essentia1. 264 The underlying assumption in Kirby and other right to counsel cases is
that the indictment is the point at which the suspect is brought for the first time face to
face with the prosecutorial forces of the government. 266 In the prison context, this
assumption is incorrect. Through the prison disciplinary process, the inmates have
already undergone a proceeding in which prison administrators have determined their
innocence or guilt. At that point, administrative detention is one of several options
available to prison administrators in order to maintain discipline and security within the
prison environment. 266 ADU may be used for a variety of reasons: to protect the safety
of prisoners; to break up potentially disruptive groups of inmates; or to hold inmates
awaiting transfer to another institution. 217 While the prison environment, in and of itself,
is an extremely restrictive environment, the prisoner in the general population retains
certain constitutional rights which protect his or her liberty following incarceration. 269
Administrative segregation is one of the most severe disciplinary measures available to
prison administrators because, in addition to separation from the general prison popu-
lation and loss of nearly all privileges, ADU confinement can be for an indeterminate
length.26  Despite the recommendation in the regulations that confinement in ADU
262 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298.
263
	 id. at 2299.
264 See Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1122. The court of appeals considered this case as one of first
impression, one that is "unique to prison crime." Id. at 1119.
20 Id. at 1120. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (the starting point of the criminal justice system is the
formal initiation of proceedings).
266 See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13 (1984). Other sanctions for inmate misconduct include parole date
rescission or retardation, disciplinary transfer, disciplinary segregation, monetary restitution and
loss of such privileges as commissary, movies and recreation. Generally, prison officials must have
broad discretion over the institutions they manage. See id. at §§ 541.10—.49. Thus, courts take a
fairly hands-off position in dealing with matters of prison administration. Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 467 (1983) (prison officials must have broad administrative and discretionary authority
over the prisons they manage); United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 952 (1976) (administrative segregation is subject to interference from courts only in cases of
"wide abuse" of discretion). See also Robinson, supra note 30, at 60.
267 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 960, 468 (1983).
268 Wolff V. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
268 See 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 (1984).
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should not persist longer than ninety days,27° prison officials are given the discretion to
continue confinement beyond that time if they believe it is necessary. 271 While the
indefinite nature of ADU confinement may seem minor to those not in custody, to an
inmate this uncertainty represents a significant loss of freedom. 272
Although the considerations which lead to placement in ADU are similar to the
considerations which lead to an arrest, the Gouveia Court refused to afford the same
constitutional protections to confinement in ADU.273 ADU confinement, like arrest,
separates the individual from the public or the general prison population to prevent any
further acts of violence. Both segregation in ADU and arrest result in the separation of
the individual from witnesses to prevent communication and possible collaboration- 274
Finally, ADU confinement and arrest result in the disruption of the individual's activities,
whether that involves employment or interruption of participation in prison programs.
Therefore, confinement in ADU, like arrest, furthers the governmental interest in
conducting an unhurried and thorough investigation and in protecting favorable wit-
nesses and evidence.
Yet, upon arrest, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are triggered and an
individual must be promptly arraigned, thereby triggering the right to counsel. 275 More-
over, arrest in combination with holding an accused to answer to charges, triggers another
sixth amendment protection, the speedy trial right. 276 While prolonged confinement in
ADU has many qualities similar to arrest and holding to answer, it was held not to
constitute an arrest, 277 therefore prompt arraignment never occurred and the speedy
27° 28 U.S.C. §§ 541.13, 541.22 (1982). See also 4 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL jusTicE, Standard
23-3.3(b) (American Bar Ass'n 1981) (Legal Status of Prisoners). The ABA recommends that
prisoners alleged to have engaged in conduct that would be a criminal offense under state and
federal law may be confined in their quarters or something more secure for no more than ninety
days, unless during that time an indictment or information is brought against the prisoner. This
limitation would serve as a practical inducement for prison administration and prosecutors to decide
promptly whether charges will be brought.
2" 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 (1984).
272 Robinson, supra note 30, at 59.
2" Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300.
274
	 704 F.2d at 1122.
276 Fed. R. Grins. P. 5(a) ("An officer making an arrest ... shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(a) ("Every
defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent
him, at every stage of the proceedings ....").
2 ' 6 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). The speedy trial right will attach if an
individual is arrested and held in custody or on hail pending a certain date to answer for that
crime, despite the lack of formal indictment. Id.
The speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment guarantees the fundamental right to an accused
of a "prompt inquiry into criminal charges" while the case is fresh. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30,
37-38 (1970). The speedy trial right protects against undue delay between arrest, indictment and
trial which may impair a defendant's ability to present a meaningful defense. In addition, the speedy
trial right protects an individual's liberty interest by attempting to minimize the disruption in an
individual's life. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). Moreover, Rule 48(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the dismissal of an indictment if there is unnecessary
delay in presenting the case to the grand jury. Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b). Finally, through the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-3174 (West Supp. 1979), Congress has imposed rigid time
constraints under which defendants accused of federal crimes must be brought to trial. The crucial
element to trigger the speedy trial right is an accusation. The individual must be an accused before
this protections attaches. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
277 See Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1122.
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trial and counsel rights never attached. 278 Although as a general rule detention in ADU
is immune from both speedy trial 279 and right to counsel scrutiny,280
 some courts have
stated that it should only be immune to the extent that the confinement is in no way
related to or dependent upon the prosecution by the federal or state government of the
inmate for the prison crime 'which resulted in placement in ADU. 281
 In addition, the
Court has emphasized that placement m ADU may not be used as a pretext for indefinite
confinement of an inmate. 282
 Finally, the government, at oral argument before the district
court, conceded that if these inmates had been at large after the murder, instead of in
prison, they would have been promptly arrested and taken before a magistrate, where
counsel would have been appointed: 283 This disparity indicates that in circumstances like
those present in Gouveia, ADU confinement should be given the constitutional signifi-
cance of an arrest which it so closely resembles. 284
The prison context reveals the most egregious example of the ability of prosecutors
to take advantage of the distinction between indicted and unindicted defendants to
postpone the formal initiation of judicial proceedingS.285 Although the administrative
detention used in Gouveia appeared to be a pretext for indefinite confinement and was
dependent upon federal prosecution for a prison crime, the Gouveia Court did not even
consider giving segregation in ADU any independent significance. Moreover, despite
the duty placed on courts to be "'alert to repress' any abuses of the investigatory power
"8 See id.
278 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 698 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Clardy,
540 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976); but see United States v. McLemore,
447 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
288 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). ADU confinement is generally not treated
as an arrest because prison officials need broad administrative and disciplinary authority over the
institutions they manage.
"I United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 426 U.S. 952 (1976) (although
the court found no speedy trial right attached due to ADU confinement for thirty-five days, it was
clear that this conclusion was based on the fact that the con finement in ADU was "in no way related
to or dependent on prosecution by the federal government of an inmate for that same offense as
a violation of federal criminal law"). See also Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1124.
282
 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983).
283
 Brief of Respondents Mills and Pierce in Opposition to the Petition at 4, United States v.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292, (1984).
284 See Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1124-25. Allowing ADU confinement to be an accusation in certain
circumstances would not necessarily result in an infringement of prison administrators' discretion
or authority since several criteria must be fulfilled before ADU becomes analogous to an arrest. See
supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text.
283 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 595-96 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (a
de facto defendant, one that has not been formally indicted, is in much greater jeopardy of making
disclosures which may hinder his defense than the de jure defendant who has, through indictment,
been informed of the charges against him and probably consulted with an attorney).
The Court's refusal to extend to inmates sixth amendment protection coincides with the current
trend of withdrawal of other prisoner's rights. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the
Court held that every prisoner retains a significant portion of their constitutionally protected liberty
following incarceration. Id. at 555-56. The Court in Wolff stated "Where is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country ...." Id. Nine years later in Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Court stated that an inmate's interest in liberty is not one of great
consequence." Id. at 473. According to the Hewitt Court, an inmate transfer from the general
population to ADU is insignificant because the inmate is merely going from one restrictive envi-
ronment to an even more restrictive environment. Id.
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invoked,"2" the Gouveia Court was unwilling to examine the government's actions to
determine if abuses of investigatory power had been present. In Gouveia, the actions of
the government in delaying indictment and arraignment resulted in the suspension of
the inmates' right to counsel, and therefore, their opportunity to build an effective
defense, while the government, on the other hand, "neatly tied its case together." 287
Confined in ADU, the inmates were completely unable to use their own efforts to help
alleviate the damaging effects of the passage of time. 288 The irreparable delay and
prejudice to the inmates in Gouveia were the consequence of the Court's holding that
the right to counsel had not attached at any point during segregation in ADU.
C. Revision of the Determination of When the Right to Counsel Should Attach
Instead of the arbitrary timeline set out by the Court in Kirby and Gouveia to
determine when the right to counsel attaches, a more flexible and functional approach,
derived from the Court's prior precedent, should be adopted to protect the rights of
the accused as well as the rights of the government. Historically, the right to counsel has
been found to be fundamental to our system of justice 289 because it ensures fairness in
the adversary system and protects an accused's right to a fair tria1. 290 These broad
protections of the sixth amendment have been cited most frequently in defining what
the counsel guarantee means for a criminal defendant. 291 The narrow approach taken
by the Gouveia majority in finding that the counsel guarantee exists primarily to provide
the accused only with assistance at tria1 292 fundamentally misconstrues the broader ram-
ifications of the right to counsel protection.
Given the broad definition of the function of the counsel guarantee, the plain
language of the sixth amendment, and the Court's prior precedent, this casenote pro-
poses the adoption of a flexible test to determine when the right to counsel attaches,
instead of the mechanical "stage of the proceedings" test of Kirby and Couveia. The
proposed test involves a three-part inquiry based on the facts presented in each case to
determine when the counsel guarantee attaches. The first step of the proposal involves
a determination of whether an individual has become an accused. 295 Second, the prob-
ability of prosecution at some point in the future must be assessed. Finally, the possibility
of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial must be evaluated in each subsequent
confrontatio n. 2"
288 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 598 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
"7 United States ex rel. Burton v. Cuyler, 439 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff 'd, 582
F.2d 1278 (3d Cir. 1978).
288
 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1122.
289 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
290 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
291 See, e.g., Ash, 413 U.S, at 312 (counsel acts as a "spokesman for, or advisor to," an accused
to enable hint to plead intelligently and meet his adversary); Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (counsel must
be present at any stage in which his absence would impair an accused's right to a fair trial); Escobedo,
378 U.S. at 486 (at critical stages in the prosecution, rights may be irretrievably lost if an accused
does not have the aid of counsel); Johnson v, Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (the right to counsel
is one of the safeguards deemed necessary to insure the fundamental rights of life and liberty);
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (it serves no purpose to give an accused a day in court without giving
him counsel to help him prepare his defense).
292 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298.
293
	 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91. See also supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
299 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. See also supra notes 96-121 and accompanying text.
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Since the plain language of the sixth amendment requires an 'accused" before the
right to counsel attaches, the first inquiry of the proposed test is directed at determining
if an individual has become an accused. Whether a person stands accused can only be
determined from the totality of the circumstances. 295 In Escobedo, the Court enunciated
a test to determine when an individual has become an accused. 296 The Escobedo Court
stated that once an investigation changes from a general inquiry of a criminal offense
into a focused investigation on one suspect, that individual has become an accused. 297
The Escobedo test would provide a simple and accurate method to answer the first inquiry
of the proposed test.
Once an individual has become an accused, the new proposal next requires an
inquiry into the nature and frequency of the confrontations which the accused has with
the government. If it appears that the government is planning to initiate prosecution at
some point in the future, 298 the second requirement of the sixth amendment and the
new proposal is satisfied. If an investigation has focused on one individual in regard to
a specific act or series of acts, the answer to the second inquiry of the proposed test will
probably be in the affirmative.
Finally, if an individual is an accused and prosecution is likely, the third prong of
the proposal requires that counsel be provided at all critical stages of the proceedings. 299
As the Wade Court determined, if the possibility of prejudice to the defendant's right to
a fair trial inheres, then the stage is a critical one in which the accused must have
counsels" Therefore, in determining when the right to counsel attaches each of the
three requirements must be fulfilled. First, has the individual become the accused, in
that the investigation has ceased to be a general inquiry and has become a focused
investigation? Second, is it reasonably foreseeable that the government will prosecute
the individual? Third, does the possibility of prejudice inhere to an accused's right to a
fair trial? If affirmative answers to all three inquiries are ascertained, the right to counsel
should attach, regardless of the initiation of formal proceedings.
Instead of applying the mechanical test formulated in Kirby to determine when the
right to counsel attaches, the Court could rely on its prior precedent and utilize this
general accusatory-critical stage proposal to determine when the counsel guarantee
attaches. By drawing on the Court's precedent, this proposal provides an appropriate
balance of interests between the defendant and the government, because it requires
scrutiny of any pretrial confrontation, formal or informal. 3° 1 Yet, the right to counsel
only attaches when the three required elements are fulfilled.
The practical application of the proposed inquiry would not provide a bright-line
test like that used in Kirby and Gouveia. Undoubtedly, use of the new proposal would be
more difficult than the simple rule that counsel attaches at or after the initiation of
29 ' See Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 (courts must look to the circumstances of each individual case
to accommodate the sound administration of justice.); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204
(1964) (the totality of the circumstances must be considered to determine if an individual is entitled
to a lawyer's aid).
299
 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
292 Id.
299 Independent government investigation, prosecutive files and grand jury investigation are
all external evidence of a prosecution. See Gummier, 704 F.2d at 1118.
299 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
500 Id. at 227.
901 Id. at 226.
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formal proceedings. 302 Despite the practical difficulties, however, the proposal would
provide the necessary protection for the fundamental right of an accused to a fair trial
by allowing attachment when counsel is necessary instead of when the government
dictates. The Gouveia Court's underlying concern with the practical implementation of
a functional rule like the proposed accusatory-critical stage test is unfounded because
the proposed test could easily operate like other law enforcement procedures mandated
by the Bill of Rights." Regardless of the initiation of formal proceedings, government
officials would be responsible for the determination of when the right to counsel attaches
by utilizing the three-part test."' Just as government officials are able to determine if
probable cause for a search warrant exists," they would be able to determine if an
accused required counsel at any stage if prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial
was likely.
The second motivation underlying the Kirby and Gouveia decisions — the concern
that the counsel guarantee could operate to overturn criminal convictions" — would
not necessarily result from the implementation of the new proposal. Under the proposed
test, a government official may determine that an individual does not have the right to
counsel; yet a reviewing court might disagree with the government official's decision.
The consequences of this court reversal of the government official's decision would not
necessarily result in the overturning of criminal convictions. Instead, as the Court in
United States v. Morrison stated, "[Oases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are
subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered ...
and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." 907 Therefore, if the
government failed to provide counsel when the three-prong test required counsel's
3"2 At the outset, undoubtedly the proposed test could produce many re-trials resulting from
evidence suppression and perhaps the overturning of some criminal convictions. But this new rule
could operate like other constitutional protections. The government, due to the operation of the
exclusionary rule, delays searches until probable cause is established. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
226-27 (1983) (government investigators observed the activities of the two suspects for five days
before submitting an affidavit with the anonymous letter in support of the search warrant). In the
same way, the government, as a result of the proposed test, would provide an attorney to an accused
individual in a critical confrontation, rather than run the risk that the evidence would later be
excluded.
303 See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Officials must warn an accused of his constitutional
rights of silence and counsel. If a court determines that an accused was not given the proper
warning and the confession was extracted involuntarily, the evidence must be suppressed. Id. See
supra note 91 and accompanying text. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). From
a totality of the circumstances, it must be ascertained that the police affidavit established probable
cause for the search warrant to issue. If, upon review, it is found that the affidavit did not provide
the basis for a determination of probable cause, the evidence must be suppressed. Id.
5" Because the government officials are conducting the investigation, they would be the best
qualified to determine if an individual had become an accused, if prosecution was likely and if the
possibility of prejudice to the defendant's right to fair trial inhered.
915 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 226 (1983) (the anonymous letter, corroborated by the
activities of the suspects, established probable cause which the police set forth in their affidavit);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1959) (an informant's detailed description of the
future events, corroborated by the activities of the suspect was sufficient to establish probable cause
for a warrantless arrest).
5')6 See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 437 (White, J., dissenting) ("a mentally disturbed killer whose guilt
is not in question may be released" because the majority believes that law enforcement officers
violated the defendant's right to counsel). See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
307 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981):
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presence, the evidence obtained without counsel's assistance might be suppressed, but
that would not necessarily result in the reversal of a criminal conviction. 308 Instead, the
government would be free to proceed with a new trial without the use of the evidence
wrongfully obtained s°9
In applying this accusatory-critical stage test to the typical lengthy government
investigation into the criminal activities of one individual, the balancing of both parties'
interests becomes apparent. Frequently, an individual will become the center of inquiry
of an ongoing criminal investigation. Once an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime, and has become focused on one individual, that individual has
become an accused under the new standard. But, under this proposed standard, the
mere transformation of an individual into the accused does not trigger the sixth amend-
ment guarantee. The ongoing criminal investigation indicates that future prosecution
will, in all liklihood, be initiated. If, during this investigation, the accused is not personally
confronted with the forces of government, the right to counsel will not attach. But, if
an individual is confronted in such a manner as to prejudice his right to a fair trial, the
guarantee will attach at that point. In this way, the accused's sixth amendment rights are
protected, while at the same time, the government's ability to conduct a lengthy and
thorough investigation is preserved.
While the proposed test would be more difficult to apply than the Gouveia test,
through the Court's adoption of a less complicated rule, it becomes apparent that
inadequate protection is provided for the fundamental right to counsel. The bright-line
test adopted by the Gouveia majority has resulted in "disrespect for ... important prec-
edents of [the Supreme] Court." 8 ' 0 The counsel guarantee demands the sensitive inquiry
set out in the proposed test which provides respect for the interests of an accused in a
fair trial and the interest of the government in a thorough and efficient investigation of
criminal activity.
D. Application of the Proposed Standard to the Facts in Gouveia
The application of the proposed standard to the facts of Gouveia reveals the advan-
tages of a flexible system as compared to the rigid one adopted by the Supreme Court.
Utilizing the proposal to analyze the Gouveia defendants' situation involves an exami-
nation of the rights of the individual, the interests of the government, and the interests
of a specific division of the state, the prison administrators. In looking to these conflicting
interests, under the proposed standard, the right to counsel would not have attached
immediately upon placement of the Gouveia defendants in administrative detention.
Prison administrators must have the discretion to take this sort of action to protect the
safety of the institution. 3 " But, once the prison administrators had held their internal
prison hearings and determined that the inmates held in ADU had committed the
murder, the inquiry shifted from a general investigation into a specific and focused
508 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 239-40 (a new trial was granted at which evidence obtained without
the assistance of counsel must be excluded); Morrison, 449 U.S. at 366-67 (defendant was not
prejudiced in any way by the postindictment confrontation, therefore the remedy of indictment
dismissal was inappropriate).
"9 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365 (remedies for counsel violations should not result in dismissals of
indictments; rather, the convictions should be reversed and new trials ordered).
51° United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1,15 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
311 Hewitt v. Helms, 959 U.S. 460; 467 (1983).
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inquiry." 2 In addition, prison records indicated that the inmates' segregation was pur-
suant to the ongoing FBI investigation, rather than for internal prison security."' There-
fore, at this point, the inmates became the accused. Second, it was apparent that criminal
prosecution of the inmates was forthcoming. Prison officials had informed the inmates
almost immediately after placement in ADU that they would eventually be indicted and
tried on the murder charge.3 ' 4 The FBI investigation and the prosecutorial files are
extrinsic evidence of the future indictments." 5 Finally, because the inmates had previ-
ously undergone prison disciplinary proceedings at which they did not have the full
array of constitutional rights, 916 any confrontations beyond this point were critical ones
because there was great potential for irreparable prejudice resulting from the inmates'
lack of understanding of their constitutional rights and protections. In addition, the
potential for prejudice at subsequent confrontations was greatly increased because
"[c]onfined in a prison ... [an inmate's] ability to confer with potential defense witnesses,
or even to keep track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired."'"
Although application of the proposed standard would operate to provide the inmates
with counsel during their confinement in ADU, this would not infringe on prison
administrators' broad discretion. Prison officials determined that the inmates had com-
mitted a prohibited act of the greatest severity, therefore the maximum punishment was
certainly warranted."'" Yet, confinement in ADU which is linked to an ongoing criminal
investigation results in an accusation for purposes of the government's investigation and
the defendants should have been provided with counsel to protect their right to a fair
trial. By utilizing the proposed standard, the defendant's right to a fair trial would have
been preserved, the government's interest in a thorough investigation would not have
been sacrificed, and the prison authorities' need for broad discretion would not have
been infringed upon.
CONCLUSION
In Gouveia, the Supreme Court continued restriction of the scope of the sixth
amendment right to counsel by holding that the guarantee attaches only at the initiation
of formal adversary proceedings. This approach seems to disregard the Court's prior
precedent which held that the right to counsel attaches at any point in the proceedings,
formal or informal, in which the potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial inhered. 319 The mechanical rule adopted by the Gouveia Court restricts
joint Appendix for the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 49-50, United States v. Gouveia,
104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). The results of the prison investigation and hearings were provided to the
government to aid them in their investigation. The investigation became focused on the defendants,
if not at the outset, at the conclusion of the prison investigation. hi.
913 Brief of Respondents Mills and Pierce in Opposition to the Petition at 2-3, United States v.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984).
314 Id. at 3 .
315 Gouveia, 704 F. 2d at 1118.
316 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974). Prisoners must receive advance written
notice of violations and a written statement as to evidence relied upon to support the disciplinary
action. Id. at 564. Inmates have a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence
at disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 566. Prisoners do not have the right to counsel at administrative
and disciplinary hearings. Id. at 569.
' 17 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1969).
318 See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13 (1984).
319 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 226, 227.
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the scope of the right to counsel guarantee in that the fundamental fairness meant to
be inherent in the adversary process is substantially diluted. Under the Gouveia standard,
regardless of the number or nature of the confrontations between the government and
the accused, the right to counsel will not attach until the government decides to initiate
formal proceedings. Instead of the flexible inquiry into the particular circumstances of
each case which the sixth amendment demands, courts can now simply determine if
formal proceedings have been started. The inquiry is very simple, but at the expense of
the protections meant to be provided by the sixth amendment.
Instead of the rigid rule enunciated by the Court in Gouveia, this casenote proposes
the adoption of a flexible, three-prong test. Under the proposed standard, three ques-
tions must be answered: whether an individual has become an accused; whether prose-
cution is likely; and whether the confrontations between the accused and the government
are occurring at a critical stage of the investigation. Unlike the formalistic approach of
Gouveia, the proposed test would allow preindictment attachment of the right to counsel
in appropriate circumstances, providing an accused with sixth amendment protection
when necessary, not when the government dictates. This flexible approach to right to
counsel claims would guarantee that the accused does not stand alone against the state
at any time.
NANCY j. MAMMEL
